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Abstract Motor movements increase the accessibility of
the thought content and processes with which they typi-
cally co-occur. In two studies, we demonstrate that putting
a hand on one’s heart is associated with honesty, both
perceived in others and shown in one’s own behavior.
Target persons photographed when performing this gesture
appeared more trustworthy than the same targets photo-
graphed with both hands down (Study 1). Participants who
put their hand on their hearts were more willing to admit
their lack of knowledge (Study 2), compared to when they
performed a neutral gesture. These findings replicate and
extend the notion that bodily experience related to abstract
concepts of honesty can influence both perceptions of
others, and one’s own actions.
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Introduction
Several studies have demonstrated that body movement
(e.g., Mussweiler 2006; Meier et al. 2007), gestures
(Chandler and Schwarz 2009), facial muscles contractions
(Strack et al. 1988; Parzuchowski and Szymkow-Sudziarska
2008), arm movements (e.g., Fo¨rster and Strack 1997;
Schnall et al. 2008a, b), and hand configurations (Schubert
2004, Schubert and Koole 2009) influence individuals’
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors (see Barsalou 2008; Nie-
denthal et al. 2005). A large amount of research implies that
not only our bodies and its modalities but also the physical
environment and the social context of cognition can be used
as an important grounding mechanism (see Barsalou 2010).
In the research presented in this paper, we test how a body
gesture commonly associated with honesty (hand over heart)
influences judgments of the self and others.
According to recent models of embodied cognition,
people use their concrete bodily sensations to make sense
of abstract concepts and the complexities of social life
(Barsalou 2009; Landau et al. 2010). As Barsalou points
out (2009), abstract concepts are grounded in specific sit-
uations, as people tend to produce broad situational content
when asked to describe concepts (Barsalou 2009). Over the
course of our lives, we experience many social situations
and learn that, for example, telling the truth is associated
with a person looking directly into our eyes or that giving
somebody a hug expresses one’s friendliness toward that
person. Such situated conceptualizations constitute the
complex configurations of multimodal components, con-
taining visual, auditory, olfactory, proprioceptive, and
interoceptive information, which can be viewed as a per-
ceptual pattern (Barsalou 2009). When a component of a
given pattern is evoked by the situation, the remaining
components are likely to be activated as well, as they have
frequently co-occurred with the perceived component in
the past. Thus, once entrenched in memory, situated con-
ceptualizations play an important role in social cognition
(Barsalou 2009). By increasing the accessibility of the
specific concept, they influence thoughts, feelings and
judgments to which the concept is applicable (Barsalou
1999, 2009; Niedenthal et al. 2005). For example, hugging
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somebody—besides expressing friendliness—is also asso-
ciated with a pattern of perceptual sensations like the
experience of warmth, the smell of the person, and so forth.
Thus, when people find themselves in a situation where
they experience warmth (e.g., they hold a warm cup or are
placed in a warm room), they are more likely to perceive
others as friendly and kind (IJzerman and Semin 2009,
2010). Similarly, activating the concept of friendliness
leads to experiencing warmth (Szymkow et al. 2013),
indicating that thinking about a concept involves simulat-
ing the relevant perceptual states (Barsalou 2008).
Embodied perspective contends that people represent
concepts using the same sensations that co-occur with the
activation of such concepts (see Riskind 1984; Chandler
and Schwarz 2009).
Bodily induced feelings can influence concept activation
even when they are primed unobtrusively, and without
awareness of their semantic meaning (see Jostmann et al.
2009; Chandler and Schwarz 2009). For example, Chandler
and Schwarz (2009), under the guise of studying the
influence of hand movements on text comprehension,
asked their participants to extend the middle finger (a
hostile gesture), or to extend their index finger (a neutral,
control gesture). While making the gesture, the participants
were asked to indicate their impressions of an ambiguously
described person. Even when none of the participants
noticed that they had been performing the gesture, those
making the hostility-associated gesture perceived the target
person as more hostile than controls. Thus, the mere
experience of a bodily sensation may activate associated
concepts, which in turn may shape information processing.
Such sensations can even influence neuroendocrine levels
and subsequent behavioral choices. Brief displays of
expansive posture typical for the feelings of power lead to
increases in testosterone, decreases in cortisol levels, and a
higher tolerance for risk, while assuming a contractive and
closed posture typical for powerlessness results in an
opposite pattern of changes (Carney et al. 2010).
Embodiment of honesty
People do not always act honestly although they may
pretend to do so (Batson et al. 1999). In particular, people
may distort the truth when it brings benefit either to
themselves or to others, and yields little harm, especially
when there is only a small chance of being caught (Bandura
1991; DePaulo 2004). However, honesty increases when
moral standards are made salient, either through self-
awareness (Duval and Wicklund 1972) or external moral
standards (Batson et al. 1999). For example, Mazar et al.
(2008) showed that swearing an oath of allegiance to a
code that does not even exist (the MIT Honor Code), or
attempting to recall norms that people do not remember
(The Ten Commandments), still made people more honest,
presumably because this drew attention to one’s internal
standards of honesty.
Is there a gesture culturally associated with honesty?
The present investigation is based on the idea that a hand-
over-heart gesture can prime honesty. Many cultures
associate the gesture of placing one’s hand on one’s heart
with honesty (not bearing arms, appearing to have genuine
intentions, giving a word of honor, and pledging allegiance,
Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1996). Since Aristotle (Bakalis 2005),
people have believed that the heart is the seat of the human
mind, and symbolically, it is still used to refer to the
emotional or moral core of a human being. If you are asked
to ‘‘follow your heart,’’ this would most likely result in a
preference for being more open and emotional—resulting
in valuing emotions in the process of decision making and
describing oneself as an intuitive thinker (see Fetterman
and Robinson 2013). Moreover, many languages (e.g.,
British English, German, Polish or Russian) have idioms
that express honesty through a reference to the gesture of
putting one’s hand on one’s heart. For example, people
might say ‘‘from the heart’’ (or ‘‘with all my heart’’) to
suggest that their statements are honest. In Poland (where
the present studies were conducted), not only is ‘‘with hand
over heart’’ (‘‘z re˛ka˛ na sercu’’) an idiomatic expression of
honesty used at the end of any dubious statement, but the
‘‘hand-over-heart’’ gesture is also a common emphasis of
sincere intentions. As a result of this connection, per-
forming the gesture or using the linguistic expression
describing the same action while committing to honest
behaviors can and do frequently co-occur.
Present Research
Performing the hand-over-heart gesture primes a broad
sense of honesty. When an individual makes a gesture
associated with an abstract concept of honesty, they may be
more likely to judge others to be more moral, or they may
assume that the other individual will act more honestly. In
other words, we suggest that the conceptualization of the
social context of honesty can in part be grounded in bodily
experience from hand manipulation.
In the present research, we investigated whether
observing another person performing the hand-over-heart
gesture would result in perceiving the person as more
truthful than the same person displaying a control, mean-
ingless gesture. Second, we examined whether performing
the same gesture influences the behavior of the performers
and makes them more honest (ready to admit that they lack
some knowledge) compared to persons performing a con-
trol gesture unrelated to honesty.
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These hypotheses are based on recent research revealing
that the use of hand-over-heart extends beyond being
merely an emblematic gesture of convenience and is tightly
anchored in the real experiences related to abstract honest
behaviors. Parzuchowski and Wojciszke (2014) have
demonstrated that an unobtrusive displaying or observing
of this gesture increases the accessibility of honesty-related
concepts, leading to the stronger use of language associated
with honesty (Parzuchowski and Wojciszke 2014; Study 1
and 2). This, in turn, leads to increased perceptions of
honesty in others and decreases one’s own cheating (Study
4) and the telling of white lies (Study 3), compared to
persons performing neutral gestures (Parzuchowski and
Wojciszke 2014). In the present research, we attempt to
conceptually replicate and extend this work for other per-
ceptions and behaviors described later.
Study 1
If people associate the hand-over-heart gesture with telling
the truth, they should infer that other persons are more
honest when they display the gesture, even if the former do
not explicitly think about the meaning of the gesture. To
test this hypothesis, we asked participants to judge the
credibility of a target person who made some not very




Fifty-five participants (32 female; Mage = 25.82;
SD = 6.34) completed an online study on person percep-
tion. Participants volunteered to participate without mon-
etary reward over a period of 3 days, in response to a study
advertisement that was posted on a popular scientific Web
site. In this study, they read a paragraph (in Polish) about a
young male and accompanying the description was a
photograph of the man with either his hand over his heart
or both hands down (Fig. 1).1
Procedure and dependent measure
The cover story presented the experiment as a study on the
factors influencing impression formation about other’s
personality. Participants were asked to read 12 sentences
about a young male who was depicted either with or
without the gesture of hand over heart. Facial expression,
posture, and the target’s lighting were controlled (held
identical) between photographs.
The first four sentences presented factual and credible
information (i.e., ‘‘My name is Piotr and I am 29 years
old,’’ ‘‘I am married and I have one child’’), followed by
eight items taken from the Polish adaptation of the
Social Desirability Scale (Drwal and Wilczynska 1995;
Crowne and Marlowe 1960) describing socially approved
but highly improbable behaviors (‘‘I have never been late
to work,’’ ‘‘I never postpone anything to the future,’’ ‘‘I
always keep my promises,’’ ‘‘I am kind toward every-
one,’’ ‘‘I always respond to letters,’’ ‘‘I have never
cheated anyone,’’ ‘‘I have never called in sick,’’ and ‘‘I
have never argued with members of my family’’). Each
piece of information was rated on a seven-point scale
ranging from 1 (This is not credible at all) to 7 (This is
very credible). This resulted in a reliable index of the
target person’s credibility (last eight items: a = .93). On
the next screen, the participants were asked four other
variables about the impression formation2 and finally,
they were to describe the target’s physical appearance
(‘‘What was Piotr’s appearance?’’ and ‘‘Which emotions
did Piotr express?’’) as well as describe the real purpose
of the experiment (‘‘What was the purpose of this
Fig. 1 Experiment 1: photographs of target used in Experiment 1
1 In line with Simmons et al. (2012) prescription, we report how we
determined our sample size, all data exclusions (if any), all
manipulations, and all measures in the study.
2 After the credibility judgments were collected, participants were
asked to judge the target’s level of agency (12 items) and communion
(12 items) traits, and willingness to involve the target into agentic
(three items) and communal (three items) activities. Those measures
were not affected by the manipulation (t \ 1), which might suggest
the specificity of the credibility rating, but there might be an even
simpler interpretation of that pattern: following measures were time
consuming, and because the picture was displayed only on the first
screen, the gesture manipulation simply faded away with time.
Because of that confound, these DV’s are not discussed in detail.
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study?’’), and on the next screen they were thanked for
their participation. Then open responses were presented
in alphabetical order to a judge who coded them for any
mentions of the gesture or a description that matched our
hypothesis. Neither of these things were found (no sub-
ject mentioned the person’s gesture or described the look
of the person in terms relating to the gesture), suggesting
that the gesture usage in this context was not remem-
bered and was not associated with the study’s purpose.
Results and discussion
The analyses focused on the ratings of the 8 improbable
social desirability items. As predicted, the participants who
saw a young male performing the hand-over-heart gesture
rated his credibility as being less dishonest (M = 4.07;
SD = 1.56) than those who saw the same target with both
hands down (M = 3.25; SD = 1.31), t(53) = 2.11,
p = .039, d = .57, 95 % CI (.04, 1.60). This finding sup-
ports the notion that merely seeing a target person per-
forming a hand-over-heart gesture increases the target’s
credibility. Participants used this gesture as a signal of
honesty, and spontaneously incorporated this message into
the meaningful impression about the target’s credibility.
This pattern of results nicely replicates the previous studies
mentioned, as we have previously shown that the hand-over-
heart gesture is associated with honesty when participants
were either directly asked to interpret the gesture’s meaning
(Parzuchowski and Wojciszke 2014; Study 1), or asked to
merely observe the photographed person performing this
gesture while listening to an audio interview (Parzuchowski
and Wojciszke 2014; Study 2). Interestingly, in the current
study the usage of the gesture was even less salient, as the
photographed person was just a portrayal of the statements’
author, and participants were not asked to pay any particular
attention to the photograph.
One reason for this effect might be the similarity of pro-
cesses underlying perception and action, as assumed by
theories of embodied cognition which emphasize that per-
ception partially relies on the perceiver’s own action system
(Barsalou 2008; Rizzolatti and Arbib 1998). If so, seeing
another person’s gesture produces bodily feedback that
could serve as a cue when judging other people’s credibility.
In the next study, we examine whether this link influences an
individual’s own behavior when they are unobtrusively
induced to make the hand-over-heart gesture.
Study 2
People generally want others to see them in a favorable
light (e.g., Goffman 1959; Leary and Kowalski 1990;
Sedikides 1993). Consequently, they may be tempted to
stretch the truth. For example, people understate their
weight in online dating profiles (Toma et al. 2008) and
exaggerate their achievements on resumes (Geoghegan
2005), especially when there is little chance of being
caught in the lie. People are especially likely to self-
enhance when interacting with strangers who have little
knowledge of the former’s previous behavior (Tice et al.
1995), or when there is no opportunity to subsequently
verify their claims (Schlenker 1975). However, if hon-
esty is brought to mind, people may resist this urge,
leading them to make more honest self-presentations. In
Study 2, we test whether bodily feedback from an
unobtrusive use of hand-over-heart primes honesty by




Twenty-four right-handed first-year students (22 women;
Mage = 24.75; SD = 7.29) volunteered to take part in the
study in exchange for a course credit. Participants made a
hand-over-heart and a control gesture (in a within-subjects-
design) while assessing their level of familiarity with some
bogus (non-existing) psychological theories.
Procedure and dependent measure
Participants were told that the study concerned whether
people were more likely to remember concepts when
learning and recalling information in the same body posi-
tion. To test this hypothesis, participants were asked to
perform two instructed postures while recognizing infor-
mation that they had previously learned in their psychology
classes. In order to unobtrusively manipulate gestures
(without priming participants with semantic concepts
related to honesty, such as one’s heart), the participants
were shown a picture of a body silhouette with four points
marked in different colors and letters (ABCD pointing to
right hip, right chest, left chest, left hip, respectively) and
were asked to stand up and read a note instructing them to
place their right hand either on point C (left chest—hand
over heart) or D (hand over left hip), while the left hand
was always placed on point D. As a result, the participants
were standing straight and either placing their right hand
over their heart or both of their hands over the left hip. The
order of the use of gestures was counterbalanced between
the subjects and did not affect the results.
Next, participants learned that recent studies suggested
that a large part of our semantic knowledge is acquired
240 Cogn Process (2014) 15:237–244
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implicitly, and therefore, people are not aware that some
data (for example, names and authors of psychological
theories) are stored in their memory without them intend-
ing for it to be so. Since the study concerned this kind of
implicit memory, it was important that subjects rate how
familiar those theories ‘‘felt,’’ even if they had no explicit
knowledge of the theories’ content. This ensured that there
was little risk that their claim of knowledge would be
challenged, thus increasing the opportunity to self-enhance
through an exaggeration of their level of knowledge.
After adopting an instructed posture (hands over left hip
or hand over heart), participants watched a slideshow
presenting names with respective authors of 11 psycho-
logical theories (one at a time for 10 s each) of which the
last eight were fictitious (e.g., ‘‘Personality integration
theory (Hudson 1993),’’ ‘‘Mere fixation theory (Beesly
2002),’’ ‘‘Agentic control theory (Scott and Schrute
2003)’’).3 Participants were then instructed to judge the
familiarity of the presented theories on a seven-point scale
ranging from 1 (I am absolutely unfamiliar with the name),
to 4 (Hard to say), to 7 (I am completely familiar with the
name). Participants’ mood was measured twice (using a
short scale from Wojciszke and Baryla 2005), before and
after the procedure. Next, participants were thanked and
debriefed. Critically, all participants were asked what they
thought the study was about and none guessed the correct
hypothesis, or mentioned anything about the idea of hon-
esty, or the social meanings of the postures.
Results and Discussion
We averaged responses of the recognition judgments on the
first three (true) theories and the next eight (fictitious) the-
ories and then used repeated measures ANOVA with two
factors 2 (gesture used: hand over heart vs. control ges-
ture) 9 2 (type of material: true vs. fictitious theory), which
yielded an expected main effect of the type of material rec-
ognized, F(1, 23) = 132.11, p = .001, gp2 = .85. This
means that participants correctly declared that they more
often recognized the true theories (M = 4.86; SD = 1.26)
than they did the bogus ones (M = 2.73; SD = 1.12).
However, this effect was qualified by an interaction between
the type of material and the type of gesture, F(1, 23) = 5.37,
p = .03, gp2 = .19. Participants placing their hands over
their hearts claimed that they felt less familiar with the bogus
theories (M = 2.50; SD = .96) than they did when placing
their hands over their left hip [M = 2.96; SD = 1.29;
t(23) = 2.08, p = .049, d = .42, 95 % CI (.001, .93)], while
this was not true when participants declared their knowledge
of the true theories (Mhand-over-heart = 4.90; SD = 1.23;
Mcontrol = 4,81; SD = 1.30, t \ 1), suggesting that these
differences do not reflect a general tendency to respond in a
biased manner. Importantly, the participants’ mood was
unaffected by the use of gesture (t \ 1), suggesting that the
accuracy of self-presentation was not driven by changes in
the participants’ mood.
In sum, Study 2 suggests that placing one’s hand over
one’s heart decreased the students’ self-enhancement
behavior when stating their knowledge of bogus psycho-
logical theories. The hand-over-heart gesture makes people
less willing to over-claim their knowledge, therefore, more
honest. This result is complementary to recent findings that
other embodied cues can make people less moral. For
example, assuming (consciously or inadvertently) an
expansive pose typical for power increases stealing,
cheating, and traffic violations, and power posing influ-
ences these dishonest behaviors through an increased
subjective sense of power (Yap et al. 2013).
Interestingly, the results of Study 2 conceptually repli-
cate the previous findings that deception is decreased
through the unobtrusive use of the hand-over-heart gesture
(Parzuchowski and Wojciszke 2014; Study 3 and 4), while
it also expands the drawn conclusions because this
behavior was clearly not limited to honesty toward oth-
ers—participants displayed the self-motivated honesty
when claiming one’s own knowledge (they were not
externally motivated to limit their self-enhancement).
Study 2 also expands the previous findings as it shows that
this effect is rather short-lasting because the manipulation
was successfully implemented within participants.
General Discussion
Taken together, present findings link bodily feedback and
sincerity, demonstrating that people’s level of honesty can
be manipulated through the unobtrusive performance of the
hand-over-heart gesture. Persons photographed while
making the hand-over-heart gesture appeared less dishonest
than the same persons performing a control gesture (Study
1). Furthermore, an unobtrusive performance of this ges-
ture leads people to behave more honestly when admitting
their ignorance (Study 2). These effects are not mediated
by changes in mood (Study 2). Although the results were
consistent with our hypotheses, several alternative expla-
nations are possible. One might suggest that the mechanism
for obtained results is due to the interceptive feedback
provided by manual haptics, which result not only in spe-
cific proprioceptive feedback but also in an additional
3 Participants saw the three true theories first (the first theory
contained the true author and the correct (famous) theory name, while
the next two theories contained only the real name of a well-known
author, but the name of the theory was slightly altered), as we wanted
to make the fake ones that were presented subsequently to seem more
plausible.
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unique cardiac loop, one which involves simply feeling the
beat of one’s own heart (Gu et al. 2013). It is unlikely, but
possible, that the present effects are not mediated by any
bodily change, but by the increase in interoceptive cardiac
sensitivity. If feeling one’s own heart beat could have
induced an increased fear of being caught lying, then lying,
in turn, could have caused increased heart beat frequency
and thus elicited a fear of lying, resulting in a haptic-
feedback loop that then lead to increased honesty. How-
ever, at least three arguments make this explanation of the
present findings highly unlikely. First, it is not easy to feel
one’s heartbeat through a shirt or a coat when one is not
instructed to do so. Second, honesty was also linked with
the gesture even when cardiac sensitivity was not possible,
because the gesture was only simulated (Study 1). Third—
and most importantly—the opportunity of lying in Study 2
was designed to be undetectable (we informed the partic-
ipants that we would not actually test their level of
knowledge), so the fear of getting caught was minimized.
Nevertheless, more in-depth examination of this alternative
mechanism for the present results could be a promising
goal of future research.
Another limitation of the current results is that in Study
1 we presented participants with a situation where there
was no reason to suspect the general credibility of the
target person, and the statements were not directly related
to the person’s trustworthiness. What seems worth
addressing in future studies is that participants should
judge the target’s credibility (when performing the honesty
gesture or not) directly, while also under the context of
limited trust (e.g., presenting the targets as students from a
competing university).
High-level social concepts, such as morality or honesty,
are challenging examples for grounded cognition theories,
as they seem to be non-perceptual. Yet, the present studies
provide a demonstration that some cultural links match
honesty, in an embodied sense, with the usage of a simple
gesture. We examined here the role that a gesture plays in
both increasing the perceived credibility of others, and in
reducing one’s own dishonesty (inflated self—presenta-
tion). The present studies highlight that bodily cues can
prime related moral constructs without conscious control,
both replicating and extending our previous results (Par-
zuchowski and Wojciszke 2014).
Traditionally, moral judgment was described as a pro-
cess involving conscious thought and which heavily relied
on language and semantic reasoning (Kohlberg 1973). Our
studies build on the social intuitionist model (Haidt 2001),
which assumes that moral judgment involves instant intu-
itions, which are automatic and amenable to contextual
cues that can change moral judgment without intention or
awareness (cf. Schnall et al. 2008a, b). However, present
studies also extend the social intuitionist model, which
presumes that moral intuitions are always affective in
nature and necessarily involve changes in the affective
states of the moral ‘‘judge.’’ We showed that the hand-
over-heart gesture can change moral judgment without
influencing emotional states (at least mood), because of the
mere association between the gesture and certain moral
concepts (as evidenced by Parzuchowski and Wojciszke
2014). In our reading, this suggests that moral intuitions are
not necessarily affective in nature—rather they are based
on associative architecture which is typical for the auto-
matic/impulsive processes (including affective responses),
as opposed to controlled/reflective processes that are based
on propositions (Strack and Deutsch 2004) and underlie
deliberative moral reasoning. In the last two decades, moral
judgment and behavior have become thriving areas of
empirical research in social psychology. Curiously, these
two topics have rarely been studied under the same theo-
retical auspices or as parts of the same empirical program,
and they now appear to be separate fields (see Haidt 2012;
Mikulincer and Shaver 2012). The present line of research
studied exactly the same embodied phenomenon (the hand-
over-heart gesture and its associations) as an antecedent of
both social perception (judging the moral character of
others) and behavior (honestly admitting one’s own lack of
knowledge). Clearly, the embodiment approach may be a
platform, which allows the integration of research on moral
judgment and behavior.
Our results have revealed yet another two implications.
First, by extending the work by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) in
the domain of metaphor comprehension, it seems plausible
that an abstract concept of honesty is grounded on a very
concrete level and can be primed with an unobtrusive use of
bodily feedback from a hand configuration. Second, our
results show that bodily feedback is used whenever there is a
temptation to behave dishonestly, yet it is not taken into
consideration when there is no need to lie. It is worth noting,
however, that the theory of situated conceptualizations
(Barsalou 2009) emphasizes the role of social context in the
process of associating bodily states with a specific con-
cept (IJzerman and Koole 2011). For example, sitting on a
chair in the living room constitutes a very different percep-
tual pattern (i.e., feeling relaxed) than sitting on a chair at an
office desk (i.e., being focused; Barsalou 2009). A multi-
modal configuration can bring different interpretations
depending on the social context in which they appear. Cer-
tainly, putting a hand over one’s heart can be a signal for
many practical reasons besides truthfulness, when presented
in other contexts, such as checking if one’s wallet is in place
in a crowded bus. Thus, the results of our studies should not
suggest that the hand-over-heart gesture can be exploited in
all contexts and situations as a prime for honesty, nor that it is
specific only to the concept of honesty. Instead, we are
suggesting that in line with the embodiment perspective
242 Cogn Process (2014) 15:237–244
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(Barsalou 1999), these findings imply that the modal per-
ceptual symbols that compose our knowledge of the concept
of honesty involve, among other things, a pattern of specific
muscle activation that is used to signal sincere intentions
with a hand-over-heart gesture.
Numerous studies document that bodily states can affect
a participant’s behavior through the alteration of their
emotional states. For example, approach-oriented behav-
iors, such as when participants pull objects toward them-
selves or they nod their heads, increase the participants’
positive inclination for the objects or persuasive messages
(Wegner et al. 1994; Chen and Bargh 1999; Brin˜ol and
Petty 2003). When participants hunch (as oppose to
standing upright), they declare more negative feelings
(Riskind and Gotay 1982). Unobtrusive contraction of the
‘‘smile muscles’’ increases the declared amusement of the
studied material (Strack et al. 1988), and the head tilting
upward induces a feeling of pride (Stepper and Strack
1993). What is new about our research is that our results
(Study 2) indicate that bodily movements can also affect
the social behavior of honest self-presentation without
altering the affective state.
This line of research enhances social embodied cogni-
tion, as it demonstrates how gestures can not only enhance
the comprehension of spontaneous language production
(Morford and Goldin-Meadow 1992), but simultaneously
alter the speaker’s behavior. Our results are important, as
they demonstrate how embodied theories can accommo-
date for findings obtained in socially based situations,
relating to the way people perceive and express honesty. In
sum, the bodily experience of abstract moral metaphors can
not only influence the actors’ perception of their social
environment but also the actors’ own actions.
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